Biography of the seven -part KGB

It’s not so loudly loudly to reach Khrushchev’s ears, but they were no longer in a whisper and not behind closed doors, as before. Critics of Khrushchev believed that the highest party and state leader is increasingly deviating from the right path. He no longer listened to others, he was arrogant. Those very people who helped him at the beginning with enthusiasm, praised him, on the contrary, with all his might tried his tireless onslaught to slow down, and even in my presence they did not fall silent.

The first of the members of the Politburo began to be discussed by the second person in the party Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and the secretary of the Central Committee Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny: it is already impossible to work with Khrushchev - this was their conclusion. However, moving from words to deed was not so easy. Both began to probe the soil around them. Being experienced people, they understood that, without securing the KGB support, they would not be able to implement their plan - to replace the head of state and the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

When one day I entered Brezhnev’s office, I immediately noticed that Leonid Ilyich feels more insecure than ever before. He went to meet me, invited me to sit down and began a conversation from afar. Very carefully and mildly, softly. The relationship that we had developed with him until then were friendly, but to a certain extent official, so that he could not go directly to the essence of the matter.

Therefore, he stopped precisely where he intended: it was necessary to convene the plenum of the Central Committee and release Nikita Sergeyevich from his post. I reacted as I considered it right at that moment: in fact - nothing. He said that you need to think, weigh everything, consult, and only then decide. On that we parted. However, I myself did not need much time for thinking.

I understood what was at stake, and internally shared the desire to achieve changes. After all, no one wanted to return to the Stalinist orders, but, on the contrary, establish collective forms of leadership and improve them. My next conversation with Brezhnev was already taking place with the participation of members of the Politburo Podgorny and Shelepin. The subject of discussion was much more specific: practical issues of providing the entire action by the KGB were discussed.

According to the results of the preliminary conversations of the main actors and at the same time senior figures of the Antihrushchev opposition Brezhnev and the Podgorny proposal to replace the first secretary to receive significant support from most members of the Central Committee, as well as at the Presidium itself. There were two more points left: to determine the time, place and method of action, and at the same time get the support of the plan from the Minister of Defense of Malinovsky.

Nobody wanted to be in the end in the position of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them. Khrushchev was still the supreme commander in chief, and although the open clash with him was extremely implausible, nevertheless, this option could not be excluded until the last minute. I did not have a clear idea of ​​specific agreements between politicians, although through our ninth administration that engaged in the protection of government members was aware of most of their meetings.

But I was not a member of the Presidium, and therefore did not take active participation in the formation of the opposition. On this solemn occasion, all leading Soviet representatives came to him with congratulations. Dozens of the anniversary of Moscow and from other countries of the socialist community, from the heads of the state and their party leaders, as well as from many statesmen from around the world, came to Moscow.

In endless toasts, in welcoming speeches, the merits of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev were highly appreciated and praised. And how else? The round date does not have an objective deep analysis, and even more so to the analysis of conflict political moments. Those who knew at that moment that the seventieth anniversary of Khrushchev would become his last triumph as the highest state and party leader, there were not very many.

I belonged to the group of initiates. I listened to the odes in honor of the hero of the day, immoderate praises, in particular, Brezhnev, and tried to read at the same time on their faces, what do all these people really feel. I conducted an internal conversation with my own conscience. It is true that N. Khrushchev helped me in many ways in life. And I never forgot everything that he did for me.

My then rejection concerned only his later political development, namely, it deserved both rejection and review from his position. The circle of initiates gradually grew, but there was still no specific plan and a single strategy of action. The questions of what to do, and most importantly - how to continue to act, did not go out of Brezhnev’s head all day. Once he called me again and asked me to come in: he wants, they say, to discuss one practical issue.

Soon I was in his office.At this time, Khrushchev was going on a visit to Sweden and, as it had already become a tradition, intended to go there with the whole family - first by train to Leningrad, and from there on the ship by sea. Brezhnev’s proposal sounded very clearly: “What if the KGB delayed the Khrushchev train when he returned from Leningrad somewhere near Zavidov and wasolated the first secretary?

However, he also regarded his capabilities well, and therefore, as the decisive moment approaches, his fear of Nikita Sergeyevich grew. Brezhnev’s proposal unpleasantly surprised me. Even if in the end the group of the Presidium stopped precisely on this option of what I was not sure of at all, our actions would be completely illegal and caused condemnation around the world.

I quickly weighed everything “for” and “against” and replied that I could not agree with such a decision. Brezhnev, obviously, did not understand the course of my thoughts at all. Completing the brakes of his imagination, he bowed the conversation to the possibility of the physical elimination of Khrushchev. And in general, how could this be implemented? Neither I nor Brezhnev would never do anything like that with my own hand.

Then who should it be? Who protects him or prepares him food? What will happen then? I believe that only such a decision is possible, ”I summed up firmly. We had nothing more to talk about. My interlocutor only thought about how to make sure that when removing Khrushchev, he would not have to look in the eye. He wanted to come to everything ready. From this side I still did not know Brezhnev.

Could I assume what I myself will wait for from him in the future? .. I wanted to think that Brezhnev just checked my reaction. I mentally returned to his proposal again and again and again unconditionally rejected him. But I would lie if I now insisted that I already realized that from Brezhnev, due to the main features of his character, the first secretary would be obtained.

Kryuchkov made me a complaint in connection with my interview with French television, in which I stated that Brezhnev suggested that I eliminate Khrushchev physically. Such an entertaining dialogue took place: - Did you report about that conversation with the Brezhnev members of the Presidium? And Brezhnev’s proposal is nothing more than a trial ball.

Give him your number. I, of course, did not give the phone number, after all, they already knew him! True, he said that I can collect foreign journalists and give an interview about his proposal. On Saturday, August 17, television showed an interview with me, in which I talked about the October Plenum of the year. On Sunday, the plot was repeated. And when the GKChP showed up in the morning, my friends began to call me and jokingly ask: “Are you instructing the day before?

Nothing will come out for them. In those August days, vice president, chairman of the KGB, Minister of Defense and Prime Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers demonstrated complete organizational helplessness. In October, we did not leave any written traces. It is stupid in such matters to lead with telegrams. We need the closest personal contacts to look in the eyes of the interlocutor.

In addition, we were accustomed that there is a political leadership in the country - the Central Committee of the party. So, we could only rely on him. In such matters, it is necessary that there is some powerful organization behind the back. The GKChP team behaved like a narrow group, which was easy to blame for a conspiracy, a coup and send it to bars.

And she lost. But the whole Soviet people, the whole great power, but let's return to the th. Events were already unfolding in full swing, it was impossible to stop them. Immediately after meeting with Brezhnev, I picked up the phone and called Shelepin. They want to commit a crime with strangers, and then? .. What will happen then?! Shelepin was completely with me in everything.

And he was categorically against such a solution ... Another thing could mix the cards. Preparations for the review of Khrushchev did not remain a mystery. Ignatov, it seems to me, tried on both fronts to secure the “rear gate” in order to be able to return to the Politburo again in case of success or failure of the ideas against Khrushchev. On the one hand, he was negotiating with Brezhnev, and on the other hand, he handed over through his guard a warning signal to Sergey Khrushchev, and through him - his father, Nikita Sergeyevich.

When Khrushchev found out that Alexander Shelepin and Vladimir Semi -Local were also going to speak out against him, he said that he did not believe in the hills. He did not even allow the thought that we could be against him. A man who nevertheless received from the first secretary the task of checking the rumors that have reached him, was another member of the Politburo, a many -year -old friend and ally of Khrushchev Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan.